Developments related to ISIS, and much else, because this is, of course, related to pretty much everything else
By Péter MARTON
Because I need to speak at an event about the situation in Iraq/Syria tomorrow, here are some of the recent trends and developments related to ISIS -- my digest of these. These are research notes, effectively.
For starters: Aaron Zelin notes how much the ISIS media presence diminished since the fall of Mosul:
And yet...
I'm old enough to remember when back in those post-surge/post-Sahwa years the talk was of there being this "residual violence" of sorts, kinda like an afterthought. It sounded bad already then, at the time. This time, the residue we're talking about could indicate that tactics are changing, and a new insurgency might be underway.
Droughts and water scarcity will continue to interact with conflict drivers. More dams are built upstream, in Turkey and Iran, less rain is in the forecast, and ISIS left much of the agricultural infrastructure in ruins:
Not all of (the remainder of) ISIS will make the transition to guerrilla-style insurgency, of course, as there are other options for its men. Many ISIS combatants fled to other parts of Syria once Raqqa had fallen followed by Mayadeen and, even, an end to fighting in Deir ez-Zor (previously under siege by ISIS for three years).
It seems that a considerable number of ISIS fighters may have gone to Idlib province and may have by now joined the Levant Liberation Committee insurgent coalition, i.e. Tahrir al-Sham. This is the coalition that the former Nusra Front, the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front, merged into.
As to Raqqa, it was taken by a mix of Kurdish and Arab (majority-Kurdish) forces (the SDF, i.e. Syrian Democratic Forces). Legitimacy of presence is clearly a key issue here, and so it's small wonder that:
Should the US pull its troops out of Syria, the Syrian government, with support from Iran and Russia, and once it is less preoccupied with insurgent factions elsewhere, would not have to wait so much for the diplomatically right moment to act as did Iraq's. In Iraq's case the international community (with many countries and their oil companies invested in the Kurdistani region's oil resources, mind you, as well as other complications, such as the presence of diaspora groups, to face) had a slightly more delicate dance to dance, with many voicing support for Iraq's territorial integrity but calling for a dialogue too. Hell, calling for a dialogue was China's position, even, and for them (with the importance of territorial integrity to them) this was a bit of a diplomatic revolution I guess. Having said that, there are US troops in Syria for now, and so for now the issue of "should they stay or should they go" remains a game-changer.
In the areas where there's still fighting, the civilian population's prospects are not good. That they find themselves between a stone and a hard place is a bit of an euphemism here. It's more like "several stones in a hard place." According to a Deir ez-Zor-based activist, Karam Alhamad:
Looking ahead into Syria's future, Russia and Iran have every reason to keep up their support for Bashar al-Assad's regime and they likely will, at the least throughout the coming Idlib campaign, but most likely further, beyond that, too.
Take one sign of Russian determination from how they continue defending their beloved (and, to all but the analytically challenged, blatantly ridiculous) false-flag-operation theories about how insurgents supposedly just love to gas themselves hoping that an intervention will then save them -- alleging such things this time related to the Khan Sheikhoun chemical weapons attack of April this year. (Just to be clear: if I were to take what they say at face value it would imply that I believe that they believe insurgents in Syria have done this to themselves on multiple occasions by now. This, i.e. shooting themselves in the foot. No, worse than that: shooting themselves not really in the foot but in the lungs.)
And so Russia is now expressing interest in seeing US troops leave, with accusations from their part, at times based on jaw-dropping video-games-based "evidence" that the US is colluding with ISIS.
Joshua Landis has a very clearly formulated assessment of the way things are getting along on the political track in the wake of the recent changes:
No wonder that the proxy war, a.k.a. the elephant in the room, a.k.a. Saudi Arabia v. Iran, is heating up, and while ballistic missiles fly in targeting Riyadh, fired by the Houthis in Yemen, a new front is perhaps opening up in Lebanon.
So there's a lot going on even if major dams do not get destroyed by earthquakes.
To be continued, by state as well as non-state actors on the ground and beyond.
Because I need to speak at an event about the situation in Iraq/Syria tomorrow, here are some of the recent trends and developments related to ISIS -- my digest of these. These are research notes, effectively.
For starters: Aaron Zelin notes how much the ISIS media presence diminished since the fall of Mosul:
"In particular, after the fall of Mosul in July 2017, the IS distribution of governance-related media dropped precipitously (by 66 percent) until the complete end of such media activity (on September 12 in Syria; September 16 in Iraq). For reference, at its apex, between June and August 2015, IS released 3,762 pictures related to governance activities in Syria and 3,305 in Iraq. When Mosul fell, between May and July 2017, IS only released 315 pictures related to governance in Syria and 171 in Iraq. And the most recent count prior to the mid-September 2017 rupture was 142 in Syria and 113 in Iraq, between July and September 2017."
And yet...
"... violence in Iraq (is) currently three times more deadly than during the roughly four-year period following the surge."
I'm old enough to remember when back in those post-surge/post-Sahwa years the talk was of there being this "residual violence" of sorts, kinda like an afterthought. It sounded bad already then, at the time. This time, the residue we're talking about could indicate that tactics are changing, and a new insurgency might be underway.
Droughts and water scarcity will continue to interact with conflict drivers. More dams are built upstream, in Turkey and Iran, less rain is in the forecast, and ISIS left much of the agricultural infrastructure in ruins:
"ISIS fighters ripped up buried irrigation pipes to mold makeshift mortars. They poisoned wells, blew up water canals, and carted off everything that was of any value, notably generators, tractors, and water pump parts."
Not all of (the remainder of) ISIS will make the transition to guerrilla-style insurgency, of course, as there are other options for its men. Many ISIS combatants fled to other parts of Syria once Raqqa had fallen followed by Mayadeen and, even, an end to fighting in Deir ez-Zor (previously under siege by ISIS for three years).
It seems that a considerable number of ISIS fighters may have gone to Idlib province and may have by now joined the Levant Liberation Committee insurgent coalition, i.e. Tahrir al-Sham. This is the coalition that the former Nusra Front, the al-Qaida-linked Nusra Front, merged into.
As to Raqqa, it was taken by a mix of Kurdish and Arab (majority-Kurdish) forces (the SDF, i.e. Syrian Democratic Forces). Legitimacy of presence is clearly a key issue here, and so it's small wonder that:
"The Kurdish fighters have named their operation to take Raqqa after one casualty they can confirm: their own Arab commander, Adnan Abu Amjad who was killed in August in the centre of the city."In the meantime the Kurds found the men and the resources to take some of the oil and gas fields and facilities on the way from Raqqa to Deir ez-Zor:
"U.S.-armed, Kurdish-led militias peeled off from their own fight against Islamic State in the jihadist capital of Raqqa to embark on a high-speed drive toward Deir Ezzor, about 120 kilometers (75 miles) to the southeast. They captured several oil and gas facilities, including the country’s biggest: the Conoco gas field and the Al Omar oilfield. The prize of Abu Kamal, though, was beyond them."One wonders if this will end similarly to the story of Kirkuk in Iraq, eventually -- lost to the Kurds after a revitalised central government pushes in to reclaim control. Of course, in the Kirkuk case the Kurdish independence referendum was the ultimate trigger for the central government's move after it was also held in areas beyond the KRG's (Kurdistan Regional Government's) control and asked voters about what the population preferred as to the fate of all of these areas (i.e. not limited to those areas formally belonging to the KRG).
Should the US pull its troops out of Syria, the Syrian government, with support from Iran and Russia, and once it is less preoccupied with insurgent factions elsewhere, would not have to wait so much for the diplomatically right moment to act as did Iraq's. In Iraq's case the international community (with many countries and their oil companies invested in the Kurdistani region's oil resources, mind you, as well as other complications, such as the presence of diaspora groups, to face) had a slightly more delicate dance to dance, with many voicing support for Iraq's territorial integrity but calling for a dialogue too. Hell, calling for a dialogue was China's position, even, and for them (with the importance of territorial integrity to them) this was a bit of a diplomatic revolution I guess. Having said that, there are US troops in Syria for now, and so for now the issue of "should they stay or should they go" remains a game-changer.
In the areas where there's still fighting, the civilian population's prospects are not good. That they find themselves between a stone and a hard place is a bit of an euphemism here. It's more like "several stones in a hard place." According to a Deir ez-Zor-based activist, Karam Alhamad:
"Civilians face difficult choices. One option is to remain in their homes in ISIS-controlled areas, often under siege and without access to basics such as food and medical supplies. These areas are also under relentless aerial attack. Those who stay risk accusations of being ISIS fighters themselves. The second option is to uproot their lives and flee to SDF-controlled camps, where the conditions are horrific and enforced conscription is rife. Some children have been forced to fight for the SDF, and some have been sent to the front lines against ISIS. Under such conditions, some have made the difficult decision to return to ISIS-controlled areas, but in many cases, they are forced to return to the camps when the Assad regime aggressively bombs these areas."
Looking ahead into Syria's future, Russia and Iran have every reason to keep up their support for Bashar al-Assad's regime and they likely will, at the least throughout the coming Idlib campaign, but most likely further, beyond that, too.
Take one sign of Russian determination from how they continue defending their beloved (and, to all but the analytically challenged, blatantly ridiculous) false-flag-operation theories about how insurgents supposedly just love to gas themselves hoping that an intervention will then save them -- alleging such things this time related to the Khan Sheikhoun chemical weapons attack of April this year. (Just to be clear: if I were to take what they say at face value it would imply that I believe that they believe insurgents in Syria have done this to themselves on multiple occasions by now. This, i.e. shooting themselves in the foot. No, worse than that: shooting themselves not really in the foot but in the lungs.)
And so Russia is now expressing interest in seeing US troops leave, with accusations from their part, at times based on jaw-dropping video-games-based "evidence" that the US is colluding with ISIS.
Joshua Landis has a very clearly formulated assessment of the way things are getting along on the political track in the wake of the recent changes:
'... the Astana peace process, led by the Russians, "is the only one worth anything at the moment. The Geneva process, led by the US," he notes, "has been about grandstanding and sticking to talking points that no longer have any relevance on the ground, such as demanding that Assad step aside and that democratic elections be held in Syria. Everyone knows this will not happen. (...) Washington continues to say Assad must leave and that his days are numbered, and yet the US has ceased all support to anyone opposed to Assad. (...) Tehran has troops to back up its position. Charles Lister notes that Iran "commands tens of thousands of Shia militiamen inside Syria, which gives Tehran more influence than any other actor, bar none.'In the meantime (as a reminder),
"... the most powerful Shia men in Iraq, including PM Haider al-Abadi and cleric Muqtada al-Sadr, are friendly with Iran."
No wonder that the proxy war, a.k.a. the elephant in the room, a.k.a. Saudi Arabia v. Iran, is heating up, and while ballistic missiles fly in targeting Riyadh, fired by the Houthis in Yemen, a new front is perhaps opening up in Lebanon.
So there's a lot going on even if major dams do not get destroyed by earthquakes.
To be continued, by state as well as non-state actors on the ground and beyond.
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